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Questions Presented 
1. Whether the EPA acted unlawfully and arbitrarily and capriciously in 
abandoning its earlier position recognizing congressional delegation of 
authority to Indian tribes to administer regulatory programs over their 
reservations, instead imposing on tribes the burden of demonstrating 
inherent authority over their reservations. 
2. Whether the Tribe maintains its inherent authority to regulate 
nonmember activities that impact water quality within its Reservation on a) 
lands owned by the Tribe and b) non-Indian fee lands, regardless of 
whether the authority is necessary to protect tribal self-government or to 
control internal relations. 
Statement of the Case 
I. Statement of the Facts 
This case is about protecting Indian tribes’ inherent authority over water 
sources within the boundaries of their reservations, which are vital to tribal 
self-governance. 
The Berkeley River Indian Tribe (“the Tribe”) is a federally-recognized 
Indian tribe that resides in Lake County in the State of Berkeley. R. at 8. 
The Tribe’s Reservation, which encompasses 150,000 acres in Lake 
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County, was established by Executive Order in 1875. Id. The Reservation 
includes approximately 1,500 acres of non-Indian fee lands. Id. The Tribe’s 
Reservation contains three primary sources of surface water: Berkeley 
River, Big Lake, and Lakeville Wetlands. Id. at 9. The Tribe relies on these 
water sources for drinking water, and its economy substantially depends 
upon recreational activities that are hosted at Big Lake. Id. Traditionally, 
these water sources were also vital sources of fishing and other wildlife for 
the Tribe, and were deeply intertwined with the Tribe’s way of life. Id. 
Nonmember activities on the Reservation are currently threatening the 
quality and sustainability of the Tribe’s water sources. At least two non-
Indian operations are emitting pollutants and other harmful substances into 
the Berkeley River and Big Lake. Id. at 14. A recent study conducted by the 
College of Environmental Science at Berkeley State University found that 
Big Lake Trading Post, a non-Indian company operated on Indian trust 
land, is leaking gasoline into a creek that feeds into Big Lake. Id. 
Additionally, the Big Lake RV Campground, a non-Indian company 
operated on non-Indian fee land within the Reservation, is emitting toxic 
discharges into Berkeley River and Big Lake. Id. The Tribe seeks to 
regulate these operations and all other activities on the Reservation that 
affect the water quality of Berkeley River, Big Lake, and Lakeville 
Wetlands. If the Tribe is prohibited from properly regulating its water 
sources, the Tribe’s economy will likely suffer, and its health and welfare 
will be threatened. 
Indian tribes were granted authority to administer regulatory programs 
over all water sources within their reservations under the Clean Water Act 
(CWA). Id. at 7. Under this statute, the EPA treats Indian tribes in a manner 
similar to that given to states for the purpose of administering regulatory 
programs over water sources within their reservations. 33 U.S.C. § 1337(e). 
In order to be granted treatment-as-state (TAS) status, the Tribe must 
submit an application to the EPA, demonstrating that it meets all the 
requirements of the CWA. R. at 7. 
The EPA has interpreted the CWA in various ways since the statute 
became law, requiring Indian tribes to establish different facts and to 
demonstrate varying levels of authority in order to be approved for TAS 
status. In 1991, the EPA adopted a conservative interpretation of the CWA, 
which required tribes to demonstrate their inherent authority in order to be 
granted TAS status. Id. at 12. In 2016, the EPA revisited its interpretation 
of the statute in order to more closely adhere to the congressional intent that 
the statute delegates authority to tribes, making a showing of inherent 
authority unnecessary. Id. The EPA’s 2016 interpretation was based on the 
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plain language of the statute, which requires only that the tribe demonstrate 
the following four criteria: 1) the tribe is federally recognized; 2) the tribe 
has a governing body; 3) the tribe’s water quality standards program only 
manages the water resources within the boundaries of the tribe’s 
reservation; and 4) the tribe is able to administer the water quality standards 
program. Id. at 8. The EPA properly made this change following both 
public comments and consultation with Indian tribes. Id. at 3. 
The EPA recently issued another Revised Interpretation of the Clean 
Water Act Tribal Provision. This new interpretation re-imposed the burden 
on tribes to demonstrate inherent authority over water on their reservations 
that was present under the 1991 interpretation. R. at 21. This interpretation 
went even further, however, and required tribes to overcome a strong 
presumption that they lack inherent authority based on this Court’s holding 
in Montana v. United States, 450 U.S. 544 (1981). 
The Tribe applied for TAS status under the EPA’s most recent 
interpretation of the CWA. While the Tribe demonstrated that it met all of 
the requirements under the 2016 interpretation and the clear language of the 
CWA, the EPA denied the Tribe’s application for TAS status. R. at 18. The 
EPA acknowledged that the Tribe demonstrated federal recognition, 
substantial government duties and powers, and capability to carry out the 
regulatory functions of the CWA. Id. However, the EPA contended that the 
Tribe failed to demonstrate inherent authority over waters and activities on 
its Reservation in its TAS application. Id. 
The Tribe challenged the EPA’s sudden change in interpretation of the 
CWA as arbitrary, capricious and unlawful under the Administrative 
Procedure Act (APA). Id. at 4; 5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(A). 
II. Statement of Proceedings 
The Tribe brought suit against the EPA in the United States District 
Court for the Middle District of Berkeley. Id. at 4. The Tribe argued that the 
EPA’s reinterpretation of CWA Section 518 was unlawful, and specifically 
that 1) the reinterpretation was contrary to the CWA, 2) the EPA acted 
unlawfully and arbitrarily and capriciously when adopting that 
interpretation, and 3) even if Montana requires the Tribe to demonstrate 
inherent authority, the Tribe has inherent authority to regulate nonmember 
conduct that impacts water quality within the Reservation. Id. On cross-
motions for summary judgment, the District Court found for the EPA. Id. 
The District Court held that the EPA acted lawfully and reasonably under 
Section 518 and Montana in denying the Tribe’s application for TAS status. 
Id. 
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The Tribe appealed the case to the Court of Appeals for the Thirteenth 
Circuit, which reviewed the District Court’s grant of summary judgment de 
novo. Id. at 5. The Court of Appeals asserted that it followed this Court’s 
precedent that the court may set aside agency action only if it is 
“procedurally defective, arbitrary or capricious in substance, or manifestly 
contrary to the statute.” Id.; United States v. Mead Corp., 533 U.S. 218, 228 
(2001). On appeal, the Tribe raised the same arguments regarding the 
EPA’s reinterpretation of the CWA and its inherent authority to regulate 
nonmember conduct that impacts water quality within the Reservation. R. at 
5. The Court of Appeals affirmed the District Court’s decision, finding that 
the EPA acted lawfully and reasonably when it denied the Tribe’s 
application for TAS treatment. Id. at 6. 
The Supreme Court of the United States granted certiorari to determine 
1) whether the EPA acted unlawfully and arbitrarily and capriciously in 
reinterpreting Section 518 of the CWA and 2) whether the Tribe has 
inherent authority to regulate nonmember activities that impact water 
quality within the Reservation. Id. at 3. 
Summary of Argument 
The Tribe should have been granted TAS status under 33 U.S.C. 
§ 1337(e). The EPA acted unlawfully and arbitrarily and capriciously in its 
reinterpretation of the CWA and denial of the Tribe’s application. 
Alternatively, even if the statute were to require a showing of inherent 
authority under Montana, the Tribe is able to demonstrate authority and 
should have been granted TAS status. 
The congressional intention to delegate authority to Indian tribes for the 
administration of regulatory programs over their reservations is clear on the 
face of the statute. The Court has long recognized that Congress can 
delegate authority to Indian tribes. See United States v. Mazurie, 419 U.S. 
545, 554 (1975). Sections 518(e)(2) and 518(h)(1) of the CWA provide that 
tribes are able to attain TAS status for tribal programs within the borders of 
the reservation. 33 U.S.C. § 1137(e). The language of the statute and 
subsequent judicial history demonstrate the congressional intent to delegate 
authority to the tribes. 
Further, the EPA’s interpretation is arbitrary and capricious because it 
does not provide a sufficient rationale for its change in interpretation. Under 
Montana v. Blackfeet Tribe of Indians, the EPA’s new interpretation should 
be rejected because it depends on principles of deference to agency 
interpretation that are altered under Indian law. Montana v. Blackfeet Tribe 
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of Indians, 471 U.S. 759, 766 (1985). This Court has long held that due to 
the unique nature of the relationship between Indian tribes and the federal 
government, statutes should be liberally construed in favor of the Indian 
tribes. See Choate v. Trapp, 224 U.S. 665, 675 (1912). The EPA’s new 
reading of the statute chooses an interpretation that imposes a burden on 
tribes, rather than one that benefits them, and thus should be rejected. 
Next, the EPA’s rationale for its reinterpretation of the CWA is 
insufficient because it relies on United States v. Wilson, slip op., claiming 
that Wilson creates doubt about the constitutionality of the EPA’s previous 
interpretation which recognized congressional delegation of authority to the 
tribes. R. at 23. This case, however, is not relevant as it deals with the 
Lacey Act, not the CWA, the majority does not address the nondelegation 
question in the case, and the concurring opinion explicitly states that it is 
not addressing the application of the decision to Indian tribes. Wilson, slip 
op. at 7. 
Finally, the EPA’s new interpretation violates the APA because its 
adoption was procedurally improper. A 2000 Executive Order, Consultation 
and Coordination with Indian Tribal Governments, requires agencies to 
engage in consultation with tribes, particularly when imposing new costs on 
them. Exec. Order No. 13,175, 65 Fed. Reg. 67,249 (Nov. 9, 2000). The 
lack of proper procedure should invalidate the new interpretation. 
Alternatively, if this Court finds that the EPA did not act unlawfully and 
arbitrarily and capriciously in reinterpreting the CWA to require a showing 
of tribal inherent authority, the Court should find that the Tribe 
demonstrated inherent authority to regulate conduct that affects water 
quality on its Reservation. This Court has long recognized that Indian tribes 
are sovereign bodies that have the right to control the lands that they 
occupy. Cherokee Nation v. Georgia, 30 U.S. 1, 17 (1831). Tribal 
sovereignty is only divested when Congress expressly prohibits tribal 
authority, or “when the exercise of tribal authority is necessarily 
inconsistent with the tribes’ dependent status.” Brendale v. Confederated 
Tribes & Bands of Yakima Indian Nation, 492 U.S. 408, 451–52 (1989) 
(Blackmun, J., dissenting). Tribal authority to regulate water quality on its 
Reservation was plainly granted by Congress under the CWA. Additionally, 
the Tribe has property rights in the water sources on its Reservation, which 
makes this case distinct from the Montana canon. Thus, the right to regulate 
the water within the Tribe’s Reservation need not be derived from the 
Montana framework, as it comes from its status as a sovereign power. 
The Tribe recognizes, however, that this Court has previously required 
Indian tribes to demonstrate inherent authority under the framework set 
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forth in Montana v. United States. 450 U.S. at 565–66. Under the Montana 
test, the Tribe also has inherent authority to regulate nonmember conduct 
that affects water quality on its Reservation. The Tribe demonstrated that 
nonmember conduct is threatening the economic security, and health and 
welfare of the Tribe by polluting its water sources. For example, a recent 
study showed that the activities of the Big Lake Trading Post and Big Lake 
RV Campground were emitting pollutants and chemicals into the Tribe’s 
water sources. More broadly, water is a vital resource that inherently 
implicates the Tribe’s health and welfare because of its mobile and unitary 
nature. 
In deciding on the Tribe’s TAS application, the EPA improperly held the 
Tribe to a higher standard of proof than required by this Court’s precedent. 
Under Montana, the Tribe is only required to establish the presence of a 
consensual relationship or direct effect on the Tribe to have inherent 
authority to regulate conduct. Id. The EPA, however, required the Tribe to 
overcome a strong presumption that it did not have inherent authority, and 
required the Tribe to demonstrate that the regulatory authority was 
necessary to protect tribal self-government or to control internal relations. 
R. at 18. This Court has never held that there is a strong presumption 
against tribal authority, and this Court does not require an additional 
showing regarding the self-government or internal relations of the Tribe to 
establish inherent authority under Montana. See Plains Commerce Bank v. 
Long Family Land & Cattle Co., 554 U.S. 316, 327–30 (2008). 
However, even if this Court were to find that Montana requires an 
additional showing regarding tribal self-government or internal relations, 
the Tribe can meet this standard of proof. Water is a unique and vital 
resource, and the Tribe requires access to a clean and sustainable water 
source for survival. If the Tribe were to lose its sources of drinking water, 
its ability to self-govern would necessarily be impacted, as the Tribe would 
have to turn outside of the Reservation for resources. Thus, even under this 
heightened standard of proof, the Tribe can still demonstrate that it has 
inherent authority over the activities of nonmembers on the Reservation that 
affect the quality of the Tribe’s water sources. 
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Argument 
I. The EPA’s Interpretation of Section 518 of the CWA Requiring Tribes to 
Demonstrate Inherent Authority for TAS Status Should Be Rejected Because 
It Is Both Unlawful and Arbitrary and Capricious 
The EPA’s requirement of demonstrating inherent authority for TAS 
status under the Clean Water Act should be rejected because the plain 
language of the statute supports the delegation of authority to the Tribe, any 
ambiguity should be decided in favor of the Tribe, the EPA’s rationale for 
the policy change is arbitrary and capricious, and the change was 
procedurally deficient. Under the APA, the court may reject agency 
interpretation when it is “procedurally defective, arbitrary or capricious in 
substance, or manifestly contrary to the statute.” Mead Corp., 533 U.S. at 
227. Thus, the EPA’s recent interpretation of Section 518 of the CWA 
should be rejected following the requirements of the APA under 5 U.S.C. 
§ 706(2). 
A. The EPA’s Abrupt Change in Policy to Require a Showing of Inherent 
Authority Under Montana Should Be Deemed Unlawful Because It 
Violates the Delegation of Authority to Tribes in the Plain Language of 
Section 518 of the CWA 
This Court should reject the EPA’s new interpretation of the 
requirements for TAS and recognize the congressional delegation of 
authority to tribes in the CWA based on the plain language of the statute. 
When a statute is clear on its face, an agency interpretation that violates 
congressional intention is unlawful under the APA. Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. 
Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 843–44 (1984). For TAS, the 
relevant portion of the CWA requires only that federally recognized tribes 
demonstrate that (i) the tribe has a governing body carrying out substantial 
governmental duties and powers, (ii) the functions to be exercised by the 
Indian tribe pertain to the management and protection of water resources on 
an Indian reservation, and (iii) the Indian tribe is reasonably capable of 
carrying out those duties. 33 U.S.C. § 1337(e). The EPA does not deny that 
the Tribe has met these requirements on their face. Rather, it reads an 
additional requirement into the second element and claims that the tribe has 
not sufficiently demonstrated its inherent authority. R. at 18. This authority, 
however, has been plainly delegated to the tribe in the CWA. 
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1. The Statutory Language Clearly Indicates Congressional Intent to 
Delegate Authority to the Tribes    
The plain language of Section 518 demonstrates congressional 
delegation of authority to Indian tribes to manage the water quality within 
their reservations. This Court has long recognized that Congress may 
delegate authority to tribes. See Mazurie, 419 U.S. at 545; Rice v. Rehner, 
463 U.S. 713, 733 (1983). The statutory language relevant to this case 
indicates that the congressional intent was to delegate authority to tribes to 
administer water quality regulatory programs upon meeting the criteria set 
out in the act. 
The requirements for TAS status are plainly laid out in Section 518(e). 
Section 518(e)(2) of the CWA is particularly instructive. It requires that: 
the functions to be exercised by the Indian tribe pertain to the 
management and protection of water resources which are held by 
an Indian tribe, held by the United States in trust for Indians, 
held by a member of an Indian tribe if such property interest is 
subject to a trust restriction on alienation, or otherwise within the 
borders of an Indian reservation. 
33 U.S.C. § 1337(e)(2). Further, Section 518(h)(1) defines “federal Indian 
reservation” as “all land within the limits of any Indian reservation under 
the jurisdiction of the United States notwithstanding the issuance of any 
patent, and including rights-of-way running through the reservation.” 33 
U.S.C. § 1337(h)(1). Based on this language, it is clear that Congress 
intended to delegate authority to the tribes to manage water quality for 
Indian water resources owned by members and nonmembers within the 
reservation. 
2. The EPA Itself Has Stated That the Language Is Clear and 
Unambiguous   
As the EPA itself points to in its 2016 final interpretive rule, this Court 
reviewed precisely the same language as appears in Section 518(h)(1) and 
found congressional delegation of authority to tribes in Mazurie. Revised 
Interpretation of Clean Water Act Tribal Provisions, 81 Fed. Reg. 30,183 
(EPA May 16, 2016). Additionally, the EPA points to Arizona Public 
Service Co. v. EPA, in which the D.C. Circuit upheld the EPA’s 
interpretation that Congress intended to delegate regulatory authority to the 
tribes in the Clean Air Act. Ariz. Pub. Serv. Co. v. EPA, 211 F.3d 1280, 
1303 (D.C. Cir. 2000). Notably, the dissent in Arizona Public Service Co. in 
large part is based on the lack of a “notwithstanding” proviso, which is 
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referenced as the “gold standard” for an express congressional delegation of 
regulatory authority to tribes over their entire reservations. Revised 
Interpretation of Clean Water Act Tribal Provisions, 81 Fed. Reg. at 30,186 
(citing Arizona Public Service Co., 211 F.3d at 1303 (Ginsburg, J., 
dissenting)). Importantly, the CWA contains the “notwithstanding” proviso 
that would satisfy even the dissent in Arizona Public Service Co. in Section 
518(h)(1). 33 U.S.C. § 1137(h)(1). The statute states that federal Indian 
reservation includes “all land within the limits of any Indian reservation 
under the jurisdiction of the United States notwithstanding the issuance of 
any patent, and including rights-of-way running through the reservation.” 
Id. (emphasis added). 
In its 2016 reinterpretation, the EPA not only points to judicial authority 
suggesting that the CWA demonstrates congressional delegation of 
authority, but it also explicitly states that its own interpretation 
demonstrates that delegation as well. The 2016 reinterpretation states that 
the relevant authorities “definitively confirm that section 518 includes an 
express delegation of authority by Congress to eligible tribes to regulate 
water resources under the CWA throughout their entire reservations.” 
Revised Interpretation of Clean Water Act Tribal Provisions, 81 Fed. Reg. 
at 30,190. Given that the relevant portions of the CWA have not been 
amended since the EPA’s 2016 reinterpretation, it is not clear how the EPA 
can now claim that the statutory language is ambiguous and is not an 
express delegation of authority to tribes. 
3. This Court Has Indicated That the Congressional Intent Was Likely to 
Delegate Authority to Indian Tribes    
While this Court has not explicitly held that Congress has delegated 
authority to Indian tribes under the CWA, it has signaled that the 
congressional intent was to do so. In the plurality opinion in Brendale, for 
example, Justice White cited to Section 518 as an example of an express 
delegation of authority to tribes over all water within their reservations. 
Felix Cohen, Cohen’s Handbook of Federal Indian Law § 10.03 (Nell 
Jessup Newton ed., 2017) (citing Brendale, 492 U.S. at 408). Further, the 
first court to address a challenge to a TAS approval under the CWA stated 
that “the statutory language of section 518 indicated plainly that Congress 
intended to delegate authority to Indian tribes to regulate water resources on 
their entire reservations, including regulation of non-Indians on fee lands 
within a reservation.” Revised Interpretation of Clean Water Act Tribal 
Provisions, 81 Fed. Reg. at 30,186 (citing Montana v. United States EPA, 
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941 F. Supp. 945, 951–52 (D. Mont. 1996), aff’d 137 F.3d 1135 (9th Cir. 
1998)). 
4. The EPA’s Interpretation of the Clean Air Act Shows That the Plain 
Language of the Statute Delegates Authority to the Tribe   
The Clean Air Act (CAA) also contains a TAS provision that mirrors the 
language contained in the Clean Water Act regarding tribal requirements 
for TAS status. Revised Interpretation of Clean Water Act Tribal 
Provisions, 81 Fed. Reg. at 30,183. The CAA requires that the tribe be 
federally recognized, that it has a governing body carrying out substantial 
governmental duties and functions, that it is reasonably expected to be 
capable of carrying out the regulatory functions, and that “the functions to 
be exercised by the Indian tribe pertain to the management and protection 
of air resources within the exterior boundaries of the reservation or other 
areas within the tribe’s jurisdiction.” Indian Tribes: Air Quality Planning 
and Management, 63 Fed. Reg. 7,254, 7,255 (EPA Feb. 12, 1998). The 
criteria under CWA Section 518 as listed above are nearly identical. By 
their plain terms, both statutes thus treat reservation lands and resources the 
same way. The EPA interpreted the language in the CAA as a congressional 
delegation of authority, and therefore claimed that no showing of tribal 
inherent authority was required. 
In Arizona Public Service Co., the D.C. Circuit affirmed the 
interpretation of the CAA as a congressional delegation of authority. 211 
F.3d at 1280. The D.C. Circuit held that CAA Section 301(d) and the 
statute’s legislative history supported the EPA’s interpretation of a 
delegation of authority. Id. The strong similarities between the language of 
the CWA and CAA TAS provisions support the position that the EPA’s 
interpretation of the requirements of those provisions should also be the 
same. Thus, the language of the CWA should not be read to include any 
requirement of a showing of inherent authority. 
The EPA could argue that the slight differences in language and the 
legislative history in the CWA and CAA support its recent decision to 
return to differing interpretations of the provisions. The EPA itself, 
however, pointed to the insignificance of the linguistic differences in the 
statutes in its 2016 reinterpretation of the statute. Revised Interpretation of 
Clean Water Act Tribal Provisions, 81 Fed. Reg. at 30,183. The EPA 
pointed to the D.C. Circuit’s holding that the CAA was an example of 
congressional delegation to support its 2016 interpretation stating that the 
CWA was also an example of congressional delegation. Id. at 30,186. 
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The similar language in the CAA and CWA strongly support that the 
congressional intent was also to delegate authority to tribes in the same way 
in the Clean Water Act. The EPA’s own admission that the statutory 
language clearly expresses congressional intent to delegate authority, the 
plain language of the statute itself, and the judicial guidance all support the 
position that the EPA’s recent reinterpretation of the CWA is unlawful. 
B. Even if the Statute Is Arguably Ambiguous, The EPA’s Interpretation 
of Section 518 Should Be Rejected Following the Indian Canons and the 
Blackfeet Tribe Rule    
If the Court finds that there is ambiguity in the statute, and therefore that 
there is some level of ambiguity, that ambiguity should be resolved in favor 
of the Tribe. The longstanding Indian canon demonstrates that due to the 
nature of the relationship between the United States and Indian tribes, 
statutes should be interpreted in a way that benefits the tribes. The EPA 
argues that its interpretation is also due deference under Chevron, but the 
level of agency deference due is weakened because of the agency’s changes 
in interpretation and the fact that the EPA chose an interpretation that 
conflicts with canons of construction under Indian law. 467 U.S. at 837. 
Thus, the EPA’s recent reinterpretation should be rejected. 
1. Statutory Ambiguity Should Be Resolved in Favor of the Tribe 
Following Montana v. Blackfeet Tribe 
This Court has long established that principles of statutory construction 
differ in cases of Indian law. Blackfeet Tribe, 471 U.S. at 766. Indian law 
relies on canons of construction that are “rooted in the unique trust 
relationship between the United States and the Indians.” Oneida Cty. v. 
Oneida Indian Nation, 470 U.S. 226, 247 (1985). Under this canon, statutes 
should be liberally construed in favor of the Indian tribes. Choate, 224 U.S. 
at 665. See also Choctaw Nation v. United States, 318 U.S. 423, 431 
(1943). In this case, this canon supports the interpretation of the rule 
recognized by the EPA itself in 2016 that avoids imposing an unnecessary 
burden of demonstrating inherent sovereignty when the statute is most 
clearly read as delegating authority to the Indian tribes. 
This Court has held that in cases where there is statutory ambiguity, such 
ambiguity should be resolved in favor of the tribe. Blackfeet Tribe, 471 U.S. 
at 759. See also Choctaw Nation, 318 U.S. at 431–32. As the dissent 
highlights in Chickasaw Nation v. United States, this canon is constructed 
so as to presume congressional intent to benefit tribes and to “assist its 
wards to overcome the disadvantages our country has placed on them.” 
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Chickasaw Nation v. United States, 534 U.S. 84, 99 (2001) (O’Connor, J., 
dissenting). This canon applies not only to treaties, but it also extends to 
statutes and executive orders, County of Yakima v. Confederated Tribes and 
Bands of Yakima Nation, 502 U.S. 251, 253 (1992), and therefore supports 
the position that if there is an ambiguity as to whether Congress delegated 
authority to the tribes in the CWA, that ambiguity should be resolved to 
state that it did. 
2. Deference to Agency Interpretation Does Not Overcome the Indian 
Canon of Construction Requiring Ambiguity to Be Resolved in Favor of 
the Tribes 
The EPA’s argument rests on the application of deference to an agency’s 
interpretation of a statute under Chevron. 467 U.S. at 837. The Thirteenth 
Circuit erred in its reliance on and application of the Chevron test in its 
decision. The Chevron test has two prongs. First, the test states that 
deference may be appropriate if Congress is either silent or ambiguous on 
an issue. Id. As argued above, congressional intent to delegate authority to 
the tribes is clear in the plain language of the statute, therefore the first 
prong of the test would not be satisfied. If this Court were to find that the 
language is ambiguous enough to satisfy the first prong, however, the 
second prong of the test would be applied. This prong considers whether 
the agency interpretation is reasonable. 
Generally, the scope of review under this prong is relatively liberal and 
“a court is not to substitute its judgment for that of the agency.” Motor 
Vehicle Mfrs. Ass’n v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 463 U.S. 29, 43 
(1983). The application of the Chevron doctrine has been restricted, 
however, and a deferential standard of review is not appropriate in this case. 
In particular, the level of deference due decreases when agencies change 
their interpretations. 
a) The Level of Agency Deference Due Is Diminished in Cases of 
Administrative Change in Interpretations 
In Good Samaritan Hospital v. Shalala, this Court recognized that “the 
consistency of an agency’s position is a factor in assessing the weight that 
position is due.” Good Samaritan Hosp. v. Shalala, 508 U.S. 402, 417 
(1993). Agency change in the interpretation of a statute decreases the level 
of deference due to that agency’s interpretation. This Court has held that 
when an agency changes its interpretation, it is “‘entitled to considerably 
less deference’ than a consistently held agency view.” INS v. Cardoza-
Fonseca, 480 U.S. 421, 446 (1987) (quoting Watt v. Alaska, 451 U.S. 259, 
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273 (1981)). Although it is not clear what this new level of deference 
should be, it is clear that it should be considerably less than the highly 
deferential standard suggested by the EPA. 
The EPA may claim that even if Chevron deference is not appropriate in 
this case, Skidmore deference may be appropriate. Skidmore v. Swift & Co., 
323 U.S. 134 (1944). The factors to consider in Skidmore, however, further 
support that the EPA’s reinterpretation should not be given controlling 
weight. In particular, Skidmore states that “the weight of such a judgment in 
a particular case will depend upon the thoroughness evident in its 
consideration, the validity of its reasoning, its consistency with earlier and 
later pronouncements.” Id. at 140. The EPA’s interpretation has not been 
consistent, and as discussed below relies on invalid reasoning. Under 
Skidmore and the above cases, then, the EPA’s interpretation is not due 
great deference. 
This decrease in deference is also supported by policy considerations. 
The purpose of deference to agency interpretation is to enable national 
uniformity in the interpretation of regulatory statutes. However, when an 
agency changes its interpretation of a statute, this consistency and 
predictability is disrupted, and thus a higher level of scrutiny should be 
applied. 
b) The Montana v. Blackfeet Rule Should Be Followed over Chevron in 
This Case 
The rule set forth in Montana v. Blackfeet provides a much stronger lens 
of interpretation than does the principle of Chevron deference in this case. 
This Court has given deference to the Indian canon over other modes of 
interpretation when they have clashed. Blackfeet Tribe, 471 U.S. at 759. 
Similarly, this Court has held that the Indian canon also predominates over 
the presumption of legality afforded to executive action. Minnesota v. Mille 
Lacs Band of Chippewa Indians, 526 U.S. 172, 194 (1999). Although this 
Court has not directly spoken to the issue of conflict between the Indian 
canon and Chevron doctrine, given the level of deference due to the Indian 
canon and the weaker position of the Chevron doctrine in this case due to 
administrative change, the concept that statutory interpretation should be 
construed whenever possible to benefit the tribe should be adopted. 
C. The EPA’s Inherent Authority Requirement Should Be Rejected as 
Arbitrary and Capricious Because It Lacks a Reasonable Basis 
The EPA’s recent interpretation should be rejected as arbitrary and 
capricious. Even if the Court applies Chevron deference and also 
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determines that the statute is ambiguous, the EPA will still fail because it 
lacks a reasonable basis for its new interpretation. In its 2016 interpretation 
of the rule, which supported the congressional delegation of authority to 
tribes, the EPA acknowledged that its prior interpretation, which required a 
showing of inherent authority, was overly cautious and did not reflect 
congressional intent. Further, the EPA itself in 2016 stated that the 
language in Section 518(e) and 518(h)(1) “expresses clear congressional 
intent to delegate authority without any separate requirement that applicant 
tribes meet an additional jurisdictional test.” Revised Interpretation of 
Clean Water Act Tribal Provisions, 81 Fed. Reg. at 30,188. 
The EPA is not claiming that its 2016 position was incorrect, but rather 
that its position has changed since then “in light of new judicial guidance 
on delegations of authority to tribes.” R at 23. Since it is not challenging its 
2016 provision, the EPA is relying entirely on two recent cases as the 
rationale for its reinterpretation of the rule. Neither case is a sufficient basis 
for this abrupt shift in policy. 
1. Even if Chevron Deference Is Applied, the EPA’s Reinterpretation Is 
Still Arbitrary and Capricious Because It Lacks Sufficient Justification 
Under United States v. Wilson 
If a statute is ambiguous, the second part of the Chevron test requires 
that the agency’s interpretation be reasonable and rationally related to the 
goals of the statute. Chevron, 467 U.S. at 837. The EPA’s reliance on 
United States v. Wilson, slip op., and Berkeley Bank & Loan v. Hayes 
Family Ranch, Inc., slip op., as the basis of its reasoning for the recent 
reinterpretation does not provide this reasonable interpretation, and thus 
should be rejected. 
First, neither case addressed the relevant statutory provision, Section 518 
of the CWA. The EPA’s claim that under Wilson, the Tribe’s preferred 
interpretation of the statute would be constitutionally suspect and thus 
should be avoided fails. Wilson dealt with the congressional delegation of 
legislative authority to a foreign nation. Next, Wilson is not relevant in this 
case because it dealt only with the Lacey Act, not with the Clean Water 
Act. 
Further, the court avoided the nondelegation question in the case, 
deciding the case instead because criminal prosecution under the Lacey Act 
“cannot be predicated on a violation of a foreign regulation.” Wilson, slip 
op. at 5. Only the concurring opinion took up the question of nondelegation. 
Even in that concurrence, the justices specifically state that they are 
referring to the delegation of legislative authority under the Lacey Act to 
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foreign nations, not Indian tribes, which are “domestic dependent nations.” 
Id. at 7, quoting Cherokee Nation, 30 U.S. at 17. Thus, the majority refused 
to take up the nondelegation question and the concurring opinion 
specifically stated that it need not decide if its view on the Lacey Act 
delegation would apply to Indian nations, and it certainly did not address 
this issue outside of the context of the Lacey Act. Wilson, therefore, far 
from creating “substantial uncertainty” about the constitutionality of 
legislative delegations to Indian tribes as claimed by the EPA, instead 
explicitly separates the issue from the case. 
This Court clearly did not intend to challenge its well-established and 
long-standing holding that Congress can delegate authority to tribes in this 
case. Mazurie, 419 U.S. at 545. The EPA’s reading of the case as holding 
that Congress cannot delegate authority to tribes is clearly erroneous. 
2. The EPA’s Reinterpretation Is Arbitrary and Capricious Because It 
Also Lacks Sufficient Justification Under Berkeley Bank & Loan v. 
Hayes Family Ranch 
The EPA also points to an unpublished opinion from the Thirteenth 
Circuit to support its abrupt change in position, claiming that the case 
creates a presumption against regulatory authority over nonmembers that 
tribes must overcome. Berkeley Bank, slip op., at 2. As discussed in the next 
section, this errs in its interpretation of precedent. Further, the fact that it is 
an unpublished opinion casts further doubt on its applicability. The Ninth 
Circuit and others have held that unpublished opinions do not have 
precedential value. Pedroza v. BRB, 624 F.3d 926, 931 (9th Cir. 2010). An 
unpublished opinion that deviates from established precedent with no 
applicability to the CWA is not a valid basis for the EPA’s reinterpretation. 
The EPA’s new requirement that tribes overcome a presumption against 
their inherent authority under Montana in order to be granted TAS status 
lacks a reasonable justification. Without a proper justification, the agency’s 
action is arbitrary and capricious, and thus should be rejected under the 
APA. 
D. The EPA’s Turn from Its 2016 Rule Violates the APA Because It Was 
Procedurally Improper 
The EPA’s reinterpretation of its 2016 to now require a showing of 
inherent authority was procedurally improper. This Court has held that 
Chevron deference should not be applied when a regulation is procedurally 
defective, “that is, where the agency errs by failing to follow the correct 
procedures in issuing the regulation.” Encino Motorcars, LLC v. Navarro, 
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136 S. Ct. 2117, 2125 (2016). The 2000 Executive Order, Consultation and 
Coordination With Indian Tribal Governments, requires that agencies not 
impose “direct compliance costs on Indian tribal governments” without 
either providing the funding for those costs or consulted with tribal officials 
early in the development process. 65 Fed. Reg. at 67,250. This new 
interpretation imposes costs on Indian tribes applying for TAS status. The 
EPA itself in 2016 acknowledged the high burden imposed by the 
requirements of the 1991 rule, stating that the applications for reservations 
with nonmember fee lands, which required tribal authority analysis under 
Montana under the 1991 rule and will again if the new rule stands, took on 
average, 1.6 years longer to be approved than applications for reservations 
without such lands. Revised Interpretation of Clean Water Act Tribal 
Provisions, 81 Fed. Reg. at 30,189. The EPA claims that a public comment 
period was provided, and thus the change was procedurally sufficient. 
Again, however, the 2000 Executive Order requires consultation with the 
tribes, rather than merely a public written comment period. Consultation 
and Coordination with Indian Tribal Governments, 65 Fed. Reg. at 67,249. 
Under the APA, the EPA’s interpretation should be rejected because it is 
procedurally deficient. 
The EPA’s requirement that tribes demonstrate inherent authority under 
the Montana rule is unlawful, arbitrary and capricious, and procedurally 
deficient. The EPA should return to its 2016 interpretation, which is 
consistent both with Federal Indian law and the law under the 
Administrative Procedures Act. 
II. As a Self-Governing Nation, the Tribe Possesses Inherent Sovereign 
Authority over the Lands and Waters Within the Boundaries of Its 
Reservation 
Alternatively, if this Court determines that the EPA’s recent 
interpretation of the CWA was lawful and reasonable, the Court should find 
that the Tribe has inherent authority to regulate the lands and water within 
the boundaries of its Reservation because it is a self-governing nation. 
A. The Tribe Maintains Sovereign Power over Its Lands and Waters, 
Because Congress Has Not Acted to Take This Power Away from the 
Tribe 
Indian tribes have inherent authority over the lands and waters within the 
boundaries of their reservations as part of their sovereign powers. Tribal 
sovereignty is not granted by the federal government, but is derived from 
the Constitution’s recognition of tribes as sovereign bodies in the Art. 1, 
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Sec. 8 Indian commerce clause and in the Art. 1, Sec. 2 clause on “Indians 
not taxed.” Cohen at § 4.01. As self-governing nations, Indian tribes “retain 
their sovereign powers over non-Indians on reservation lands unless the 
exercise of that sovereignty would be inconsistent with the overriding 
interest of the National Government.” Brendale, 492 U.S. at 450 
(Blackmun, J., dissenting). In other words, the Tribe has inherent authority 
to regulate conduct on its land unless Congress has acted to take that power 
away, or “in those circumstances principally involving external powers of 
sovereignty where the exercise of tribal authority is necessarily inconsistent 
with the tribes’ dependent status.” Id. at 451–52. Here, Congress has not 
acted to take away the Tribe’s sovereign power over the water on its 
Reservation. Instead, Congress has affirmed the Tribe’s sovereign powers 
by delegating authority to the Tribe to regulate their water sources under the 
CWA. 
B. The Tribe’s Regulation of Water Quality on Its Reservation Is Not 
Inconsistent with the Tribe’s Dependent Status, Because Tribal Rights to 
Water Sources Are Vital for Tribal Self-Governance 
Additionally, the Tribe’s regulation of water quality is not inconsistent 
with the Tribes’ dependent status, because the federal government has 
recognized that tribal rights over water sources are vital for tribal self-
governance. The federal government’s original intent behind establishing 
Indian reservations included “Congress’ objective of furthering tribal self-
government . . . [and] encouraging ‘tribal self-sufficiency and economic 
development.’” New Mexico v. Mescalero Apache Tribe, 462 U.S. 324, 335 
(1983) (citing White Mountain Apache Tribe v. Bracker, 448 U.S. 136, 143 
(1980) (footnote omitted)). These goals led the federal government to 
recognize that “tribes have the power to manage the use of their territory 
and resources by both members and nonmembers.” Id. Without the power 
to manage its territory and resources, true self-governance and self-
sufficiency by an Indian tribe would not be possible. To that end, if the 
Tribe is denied the power to manage the use of its water sources, the Tribe 
will not be able to self-govern. Tribal regulation of water, therefore, is 
consistent with Congress’s original intent in establishing tribal reservations. 
Under this Court’s long-standing precedent, the burden is not on the 
Tribe to demonstrate its inherent authority, but on the government to 
demonstrate that the Tribe’s authority has been taken away. In the present 
case, Congress has not acted to take away the Tribe’s inherent authority to 
regulate water quality on its Reservation. In fact, Congress’s intent was to 
delegate the right to regulate water quality in the CWA to Indian tribes. 
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Additionally, the tribal regulation of water is not inconsistent with the 
interests of the national government, as it furthers the national 
government’s goal of tribal self-governance. Thus, the Tribe has the 
sovereign power to exercise authority over its lands and waters. 
C. Indian Tribes Have Recognized Property Rights over Water on Their 
Reservations, Which Sets This Case Apart from Montana 
Following Montana v. United States, this Court has read the scope of 
Indian tribes’ civil authority over nonmembers more narrowly, and has 
turned away from the presumption that Indian tribes have authority over 
nonmembers on their reservations. However, the present case is distinct 
from the Montana reasoning because Indian tribes have recognized 
property rights in the water sources on their reservations. In Winters v. 
United States, this Court found that when the federal government 
established reservations for Indian tribes, the government granted the tribes 
sufficient water to fulfill the purposes of the reservation. 207 U.S. 564, 
576–77 (1908). In other words, this Court recognized that water rights were 
necessary for tribal self-government, and that the federal government 
reserved the Indian tribes’ rights to the resources they would need to be 
self-sustaining. Tribal property rights to water are also derived in part from 
tribe’s historical use of the land. See, e.g., Colville Confederated Tribes v. 
Walton, 647 F.2d 42, 47–49 (9th Cir. 1981) (holding that the Tribe had 
reserved rights to water because it had demonstrated traditional reliance on 
fishing). In the present case, the Tribe at minimum “has property rights 
arising from its historic use of the Reservation’s waters.” R. at 13. 
The Tribe’s property rights to the water on its Reservation set this case 
apart from the Montana holding. As one federal Indian scholar has noted, 
“application of the Montana rule in the on-reservation regulatory context is 
uncertain because waters subject to reserved rights are not equivalent to 
non-member fee land.” Robert T. Anderson, Water Rights, Water Quality, 
and Regulatory Jurisdiction in Indian Country, 34:2 Stan. Envtl. L.J. 195, 
215 (2015). Montana, and the subsequent cases in which Montana was 
applied, dealt with “interests in land [that] were taken away by Congress 
and granted directly to non-Indians,” rather than land that continues to 
belong to the Tribe. Id. Because of this distinction, Montana does not apply 
in the present case. Thus, this Court ought to look to the long line of 
precedent that establishes Tribal inherent authority over the lands and 
waters on their reservations unless Congress has acted to take such 
authority away. Under this understanding of tribal sovereignty, the Tribe in 
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the present case has the authority to regulate nonmember conduct on its 
Reservation that impacts the quality of the Tribe’s water sources.  
III. Under Montana v. United States, the Tribe Retains Authority to 
Regulate Nonmember Conduct That Affects Water Quality Because Poor 
Water Quality Threatens the Economic Security, and Health and Welfare of 
the Tribe 
Even if the Court declines to find inherent authority to regulate water in 
the Tribe’s presumed sovereign powers, the Tribe nevertheless maintains its 
inherent authority under the framework set forth in Montana v. United 
States. Under this Court’s holding in Montana v. United States, the Tribe 
retains authority to regulate nonmember conduct that affects water quality 
within the Reservation because this conduct threatens the economic 
security, and the health and welfare of the Tribe. 450 U.S. at 565–66. In 
Montana, this Court established “the general proposition that the inherent 
sovereign powers of an Indian tribe do not extend to the activities of 
nonmembers of the tribe.” Id. at 544. However, Montana laid out two 
exceptions in which the Tribe retains inherent authority to regulate 
nonmember’s conduct: 1) “the tribe may regulate, through taxation, 
licensing, or other means, the activities of nonmembers who enter 
consensual relationships with the tribe or its members, through commercial 
dealing, contracts, leases, or other arrangements,” (herein the consensual 
relationship exception), and 2) “[the] tribe may also retain inherent power 
to exercise civil authority over the conduct of non-Indians on fee lands 
within its reservation when that conduct threatens or has some direct effect 
on the political integrity, the economic security, or the health or welfare of 
the tribe,” (herein the direct effects exception). Id. at 565–66. In the present 
case, the Tribe has inherent authority to regulate nonmember activities that 
affect water quality under the direct effects exception, because the Tribe’s 
water sources supply the Tribe’s drinking water and support a substantial 
part of the Tribe’s economy. 
A. The Montana Exceptions Test Applies to Both Tribal Land and Non- 
Indian Fee Land Within the Reservation 
The Tribe maintains inherent authority to regulate the conduct of 
nonmembers both on land owned by the Tribe and on fee land when that 
conduct threatens the economic security, and health and welfare of the 
Tribe. At one time, this Court “readily agree[d]” that the Tribe could 
regulate nonmember conduct on land owned by the Tribe. Id. at 555. 
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Specifically, in Montana, this Court held that “the Tribe may prohibit 
nonmembers from hunting or fishing on land belonging to or held by the 
United States in trust for the Tribe.” Id. Because of this, the Montana 
exceptions as written only apply to nonmember conduct on fee land. 
However, this Court later held in Nevada v. Hicks that, while a significant 
factor in the analysis, “the existence of tribal ownership is not alone enough 
to support regulatory jurisdiction over nonmembers.” Nevada v. Hicks, 533 
U.S. 353, 360 (2001). Following Hicks, lower courts have applied the 
Montana exceptions test to nonmember conduct on land owned by Indian 
tribes, as well as non-Indian fee lands. See Soaring Eagle & Resort v. 
NLRB, 791 F.3d 648, 666 (6th Cir. 2015); Stifel v. Lac DU Flambeau Band 
of Lake Superior Chippewa Indians, 807 F.3d 184, 207 (7th Cir. 2015). 
Therefore, the Tribe will apply the Montana exceptions test to nonmember 
conduct both on land owned by the Tribe and on fee land to establish that 
the Tribe has inherent authority over these activities affecting water quality. 
B. The Tribe Demonstrated That Nonmember Conduct on Tribal Land 
and Fee Land Was Affecting Water Quality in a Way That Threatened 
the Tribe’s Economic Security, and Health and Welfare of the Tribe 
The Tribe has inherent authority over the conduct of nonmembers that 
affects water quality because this conduct threatens the economic security, 
and health and welfare of the Tribe. Though this Court has not yet 
considered whether poor water quality falls within the Montana exceptions, 
lower courts have found that water quality can threaten the welfare of the 
Tribe. The Ninth Circuit has recognized in several cases that “threats to 
water rights may invoke inherent tribal authority over non-Indians.” 
Montana v. United States EPA, 137 F.3d at 1141. Specifically, in Montana 
v. United States EPA, the Ninth Circuit found that “the activities of 
nonmembers [affecting water quality] posed such serious and substantial 
threats to Tribal health and welfare that Tribal regulation was essential.” Id. 
In Confederated Salish & Kootenai Tribes of Flathead Reservation v. 
Namen, the Ninth Circuit explained that conduct that affects Tribal water 
sources, “if unregulated, could increase water pollution, damage the 
ecology of the lake, interfere with treaty fishing rights, or otherwise harm 
the lake . . . [therefore, this regulation] falls squarely within the exception 
recognized in Montana.” 665 F.2d 951, 964 (9th Cir. 1982). Similarly, the 
Seventh Circuit held that an Indian tribe had inherent authority to regulate 
water on its reservation under Montana, noting that the tribe had 
demonstrated that, “its water resources are essential to its survival.” 
Wisconsin v. EPA, 266 F.3d 741, 750 (7th Cir. 2001). This Court ought to 
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apply the same reasoning in finding that poor water quality on the Tribe’s 
Reservation directly affects the economic security, and health and welfare 
of the Tribe. 
The Tribe submitted evidence to the EPA in its application for TAS 
status that demonstrated that nonmember conduct on tribal land and fee 
land threatened the quality of the Tribe’s water sources. In its application 
for TAS status, the Tribe cited to a recent study conducted by the College 
of Environmental Science at Berkeley State University that concluded that 
insufficient water regulation “poses a direct threat to water quality on the 
Reservation, including the quality of the Berkeley River, Big Lake, and the 
Lakeville Wetlands.” R. at 14. The study specifically highlighted two non-
Indian operations that threaten the Tribe’s waters, that the Tribe included in 
its TAS application: the Big Lake Trading Post and the Big Lake RV Co. 
Id. 
First, the study found that the Big Lake Trading Post, a gasoline service 
station operated on Indian trust land within the Reservation, was leaking 
gasoline into a creek that runs into the Berkeley River. Id. The Tribe relies 
on its water sources, including Berkeley River, for drinking water. Because 
of this, contaminated or polluted lake water would seriously threaten the 
health and welfare of the Tribe. Id. at 9. Additionally, the Tribe’s economy 
substantially depends upon recreational activity at Berkeley River and upon 
the fish and wildlife of the lake. Id. If Berkeley River were polluted and 
people were not able to fish there or use the lake for recreational activities, 
the Tribe’s economy would suffer. Therefore, the Tribe has inherent 
authority to regulate the conduct of Big Lake Trading Post, operated by 
nonmembers, under Montana’s direct effects exception. 
Second, the study found that activities of Big Lake RV Campground, 
operated by a non-Indian company on non-Indian fee land, threaten water 
quality on the Reservation. Id. at 14. The study found that the Big Lake RV 
Campground is emitting discharges into the Berkeley River and Big Lake 
that have “caused and will continue to cause serious and substantial impacts 
on the water quality of the Reservation.” Id. As stated, both the Berkeley 
River and Big Lake provide the Tribe with drinking water and play a 
substantial role in the Tribe’s economy by hosting recreational activities. Id. 
at 9. If the waters continue to be polluted, the health of Tribe members and 
the Tribe’s economy will suffer. Therefore, the Tribe has inherent authority 
to regulate the activities of the Big Lake RV Campground because it 
directly affects the Tribe’s economic security, and health and welfare. 
Montana, 450 U.S. at 566. 
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1. Even if the Tribe Did Not Establish Specific Nonmember Conduct That 
Requires Regulation, the Unique Properties of Water Require Uniform 
Regulation by the Tribe 
The EPA denied the Tribe’s TAS application, claiming that the Tribe had 
presented only “generalized findings that insufficient regulation of water 
quality on the Reservation threatens the Tribe and its members.” R. at 19. 
The EPA asserted that the study’s findings regarding the Big Lake Trading 
Post and the Big Lake RV Campground did not sufficiently show that 
regulation was necessary to protect the Tribe, and that the findings did not 
“suffice to overcome the strong presumption against Tribal jurisdiction.” Id. 
at 19. As discussed below, holding the Tribe to this standard of proof is 
improper. However, if this Court agrees that the findings regarding Big 
Lake Trading Post and the Big Lake RV Campground do not sufficiently 
demonstrate that the Tribe’s economy and welfare are threatened by 
insufficient regulation of water, the Court should recognize that water is a 
unique resource that inherently threatens the Tribe’s welfare if not properly 
regulated. 
If the Tribe is unable to regulate the conduct of nonmembers that affects 
water quality, the Tribe’s water sources are likely to become contaminated. 
Because of the inherent properties of water, nonmember conduct that 
affects water quality will inevitably impact the Tribe and its members. The 
Ninth Circuit recognized that, “due to the mobile nature of pollutants in 
surface water it would in practice be very difficult to separate the effects of 
water quality impairment on non-Indian fee land from impairment on the 
tribal portions of the reservation.” Montana v. United States EPA, 137 F.3d 
at 1141. The Ninth Circuit also recognized that, “[a] water system is a 
unitary resource. The actions of one user have an immediate and direct 
effect on other users.” Colville Confederated Tribes, 647 F.2d at 52. Based 
in part on this reasoning, the Ninth Circuit in Colville Confederated Tribes 
found that it was sufficient for the Tribe “to allege[] that the [defendant 
non-Indian] Wantons’ appropriations from No Name Creek imperiled the 
agricultural use of downstream tribal lands and the trout fishery, among 
other things,” in holding that the “[r]egulation of water on a reservation is 
critical to the lifestyle of its residents and the development of resources . . . 
[and] [i]ts regulation is an important sovereign power [for the Tribe].” Id. 
The findings of the study conducted by the College of Environmental 
Science at Berkeley State University demonstrate that the Tribe in the 
present case faces similar issues. The study found that it would be 
“difficult, if not impossible” for the Tribe “to separate the effects of water 
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quality impairment on non-Indian fee lands from impairment on tribal lands 
within the Reservation because actions on fee lands have immediate and 
direct effects on water quality and thus on other users of waters within the 
Reservation.” R. at 14. Thus, this Court should follow the Ninth Circuit in 
recognizing that the Tribe must be able to regulate all conduct that affects 
water quality, regardless of whether the conduct is by members or 
nonmembers, or if it occurs on Tribal or fee land. Any less will not allow 
the Tribe to effectively regulate its water sources, as actions taken on the 
Reservation by nonmembers could negate any meaningful regulation by the 
Tribe. In order for the Tribe to be able to effectively regulate water quality, 
regulations must be uniform across the Reservation. If the Tribe is 
prohibited from regulating nonmember conduct or conduct on fee land, the 
economic security, and the health and welfare of the Tribe will be 
threatened.  
2. Regulation of Water Quality Falls Within the Montana Direct Effects 
Exception, Even When the Exception Is Narrowly Applied 
Following Montana, this Court narrowed the scope of the direct effects 
exception in its subsequent cases. See Atkinson Trading Co. v. Shirley, 532 
U.S. 645, 654–55 (2001) (holding that these exceptions are “limited ones” 
and cannot be allowed to “swallow the rule”); Strate v. A-1 Contrs., 520 
U.S. 438, 455–58 (1997) (holding that the exceptions cannot “severely 
shrink” the rule). As one of the leading scholars on federal Indian law 
observed, cases following Montana have “suggest[ed] that tribal power 
must be necessary to avert catastrophic consequences” in order for the 
direct effects exception to apply. Cohen at § 4.02. However, even under this 
narrow reading of Montana, the Tribe still retains inherent authority to 
regulate water quality, because water is a critical resource to the Tribe’s 
welfare and survival. As stated, the properties of water require uniform 
regulation by the Tribe to be meaningful and effective. If the Tribe is not 
able to regulate the activities of nonmembers that impact water quality, 
“catastrophic consequences” may result, such as the loss of a source of 
potable water, or the spread of disease among the Tribe from use of 
contaminated water. Regulation of water, therefore, falls within this Court’s 
narrow reading of the Montana direct effects exception. 
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C. The EPA Improperly Required the Tribe to Overcome a Strong 
Presumption That It Lacks Regulatory Authority over Nonmembers 
Unless Such Authority Is Necessary to Protect Tribal Self-Government 
or to Control Internal Relations 
In deciding whether to grant the Tribe TAS status, the EPA required the 
Tribe to overcome a strong presumption that it lacks regulatory authority 
over nonmembers unless such authority is necessary to protect tribal self-
government or to control internal relations. R. at 25. This burden of proof is 
improper. The correct standard of proof only requires the Tribe to establish 
the presence of a Montana exception, in order to overcome the presumption 
that the Tribe lacks inherent authority to regulate nonmembers. 
This standard was first articulated in Montana and was recently affirmed 
by this Court in Plains Commerce Bank v. Long Family Land & Cattle Co., 
554 U.S. at 327–30. In that case, this Court held that “[because] efforts by a 
tribe to regulate nonmembers, especially on non-Indian fee land, are 
presumptively invalid . . . [t]he burden rests on the tribe to establish one of 
the exceptions to Montana’s general rule that would allow an extension of 
tribal authority to regulate nonmembers on non-Indian fee land.” Id. at 330. 
Under this holding, if the Tribe is able to establish the presence of one of 
the Montana exceptions, it has met its burden of proof. The Tribe 
recognizes that this Court has read the Montana exceptions narrowly. See 
Atkinson Trading Co. v. Shirley, 532 U.S. 645, 654–55 (2001) (holding that 
these exceptions are “limited ones” and cannot be allowed to “swallow the 
rule”); Strate v. A-1 Contrs., 520 U.S. 438, 455–58 (1997) (holding that the 
exceptions cannot “severely shrink” the rule). However, as this Court’s 
most recent decision on the matter,
1
 Plains Commerce Bank should guide 
the EPA in its interpretation of the Tribe’s inherent authority. 
It is inconsistent with Plains Commerce Bank and Montana for the EPA 
to require the Tribe to overcome a “strong presumption” against its inherent 
authority by showing that jurisdiction is “necessary to protect tribal self-
government or to control internal relations.” R. at 25 (emphasis added). 
                                                                                                             
1. This Court did consider the Montana test and the scope of a Tribe’s inherent authority 
over nonmembers in Dollar General Corporation v. Mississippi Band of Choctaw Indians, 
136 S. Ct. 2159 (2016), aff’g by an equally divided court Dolgencorp, Inc. v. Miss. Band of 
Choctaw Indians, 746 F.3d 167 (5th Cir. 2014). In Dollar General Corporation, this Court 
affirmed the Fifth Circuit’s decision in a 4-4 decision, but did not issue an accompanying 
opinion. The Fifth Circuit held that the Montana consensual relationship exception does not 
require an “additional showing” that the relationship implicates tribal governance or internal 
relations. Dolgencorp, Inc. v. Miss. Band of Choctaw Indians, 746 F.3d 167, 170 (5th Cir. 
2014). 
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This Court has never held that there is a strong presumption against the 
inherent authority of Tribes. Additionally, this Court has consistently held 
that Indian tribes have met their burden of proof to establish inherent 
authority by showing the presence of the Montana exceptions, and has not 
required an additional showing regarding tribal self-government or internal 
relations. See Plains Commerce Bank, 554 U.S. at 327–30.  
1. The EPA Justifies This Standard of Proof by Citing Berkeley Bank & 
Loan v. Hayes Family Ranch, Inc., a Circuit Court Decision That Was 
Improperly Decided 
The EPA cites to the Thirteenth Judicial Circuit’s unpublished decision 
in Berkeley Bank, slip op., as justification for applying this higher burden of 
proof. R. at 25. However, the Berkeley Bank opinion misinterprets this 
Court’s prior holdings on the Indian tribes’ inherent authority. Berkeley 
Bank found that “a tribe presumptively lacks jurisdiction over 
nonmembers,” and that “to overcome this presumption, the tribe must show 
that jurisdiction is necessary to protect tribal self-government or to control 
internal relations.” Slip op. at 2. The second part of this holding is 
inconsistent with this Court’s precedent. As previously stated, this Court 
has consistently recognized that the exceptions set forth in Montana are 
sufficient to show the Tribe has inherent authority without an additional 
showing regarding tribal self-government or internal relations. See 
Montana, 450 U.S. at 565–66; Plains Commerce Bank, 554 U.S. at 327–30. 
The Thirteenth Circuit cites to Dolgencorp v. Mississippi Band of 
Choctaw Indians, 746 F.3d 167 (5th Cir. 2014), a Fifth Circuit opinion, to 
support the second part of its holding. However, Dolgencorp applies the 
Montana exceptions in their original form, without requiring an “additional 
showing” regarding the internal relations of the Tribe. Id. at 175. 
Additionally, even if Dolgencorp can be read to require a showing 
regarding tribal self-governance or internal relations of the Tribe, the EPA 
should not look to a circuit opinion when there is clear precedent from this 
Court to guide its interpretation. 
D. Even if This Court Interprets the Montana Test to Require an 
Additional Showing Regarding Tribal Self-Government Internal 
Relations, the Tribe Can Still Meet This Standard of Proof 
While the Tribe maintains that this Court does not require an additional 
showing regarding tribal self-governance or internal relations under 
Montana, regulation of water quality does implicate issues of self-
governance. Water is a vital resource that every person needs to survive. 
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Therefore, a lack of potable water on the Reservation would likely cause 
self-governance issues for the Tribe. If the Tribe’s drinking water sources 
became polluted, then the Tribe would need to turn outside of the 
Reservation to supply clean drinking water for its members. This would 
inevitably impede the Tribe’s ability to govern itself, and could lead to 
internal dissent among Tribe members, or cause other internal relations 
issues for the Tribe. Therefore, though this Court’s precedent does not 
require a showing that the conduct of nonmembers is necessary to protect 
tribal self-government or to control internal relations, the regulation of 
water quality does implicate issues of self-governance. 
Conclusion 
For the foregoing reasons, this Court should deny the decision of the 
United States Court of Appeals for the Thirteenth Circuit and hold that 1) 
the EPA acted unlawfully and arbitrarily and capriciously in its most recent 
reinterpretation of the CWA, or alternatively that 2) the Tribe has inherent 
authority to regulate activities by nonmembers that affect water quality 
within the Reservation. 
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